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- How a chimpanzee named Clint trained a psychologist to question human exceptionalism and reconsider the intelligence of apes
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However, many consider animal traditions, including those in ape apes, to be cognitive different from topic cultures, largely because of lack of evidence for cumulative evolutions and normative conformity, but perhaps also because current research on ape ape is usually restricted to behavioral comparisons.
Here, we propose to analyze intro example analytical essay topic not only at the essay behavioral level but also at the underlying cognitive evolution. To this end, we integrate empirical findings in apes with great frameworks developed in developmental psychology regarding the representation of tools and the development of metarepresentational abilities, to characterize the differences great ape and human cultures at the cognitive level.
Current data are consistent with the essay of apes possessing mental representations of tools that can be accessed cognitive re-representations: apes may reorganize their knowledge of tools in the form of categories or functional schemes.
In contrast to Herrmann et al. We adjusted the size of the material used to be operable for the baboons and long-tailed macaques, respectively. To facilitate the comparison of our results with those of Herrmann and colleagues, we here applied the same terminology as in the previous study. In the discussion, we will critically evaluate some of the connotations associated with the terms used for these experiments. In the following we will shortly outline the experimental procedure of the 16 tasks of the PCTB. Some tasks consist of different items, which are described in detail in the Supporting Information and Herrmann et al . Physical Domain Space. In total this scale is made up of four different tasks: Spatial Memory, Object Permanence, Rotation, and Transposition. In each task, three cups were aligned in a row on the testing tray and manipulated differently: To test their Spatial Memory two rewards were placed under two of the three cups and the subject was allowed to choose twice. In the Object Permanence task a small opaque cup, which contained a reward, was moved under one or two of the three larger cups in succession, leaving the reward under one of these at the end. The subject had to track these operations to locate the reward. We conducted an additional control condition in which the experimenter also touched the cups under which the smaller cup was not moved with her hand to examine whether the subjects only chose the last cup touched by the experimenter or really took into account where the smaller cup was moved to. The subjects had to follow the rotation to locate the reward. In the Transposition task the position of the baited cup was switched with the position of the other cups in three different ways. The subjects had to follow these transpositions to locate the reward. To test the monkeys' abilities to discriminate between different food amounts, we conducted different two-choice experiments where they received the amount of food pieces they had pointed at. This scale consisted of two tasks: Relative Numbers and Addition Numbers. In the so-called Relative Numbers task the monkeys could choose between 1 and 8 food pieces lying on two different plates with differences between the two amounts ranging from 1 to 4 pieces. In the so-called Addition Numbers task the subjects were shown three different amounts of food items. The food items from the center plate were transferred to one of the side plates after a few seconds. The subjects had to choose the resulting larger number to be scored as a correct response. To test their understanding of the spatial-causal relationships between two objects the monkeys were tested in four different tasks: Noise, Shape, Tool Use, and Tool Properties. In the Noise task, the subjects had to choose one of two cups. To give them a hint where the reward was located the cups were shaken. One cup contained a peanut and made a rattling sound when shaken. In the Shape task either two plastic boards or two pieces of cloth were placed on the tray. A reward was placed under one of the boards or cloths causing a visible bump, and the subjects were allowed to choose. To test their Tool Use abilities a reward was placed on the tray out of reach of the subject and a wooden stick was provided to the subject. The subject had to use the tool to retrieve the out of reach food. In the Tool Properties task a functional and a non-functional tool were presented. For example, a reward was placed on top of one piece of cloth, whereas the other reward was placed directly next to the other cloth piece. The subjects were allowed to pull one of the two pieces. Altogether, five different items were used in this task cloth: food was placed on top or right next to a piece of cloth; Plexiglas bridge: a small bridge was placed over a piece of cloth; food was placed on top of the bridge or underneath directly onto the cloth; ripped cloth: food was placed on an intact or a ripped piece of cloth; broken wool: food was tied to the end of an intact or cut string of wool; tray circle: food was placed into a cardboard piece with a round hole in it or with a u-shaped opening, an attached string allowed the monkeys to pull the tray. Social Domain Social Learning. To test whether the monkeys' imitate simple actions done by a human to get food three different items were used. In all experiments a human demonstrator showed the subjects how to open three different plastic tubes which contained a reward Paper tube, Banana tube, Stick tube. We scored whether the subjects solved the problem by the same means as the demonstrator. The behaviour of the subjects was compared to that of a control group 3 baboons and 3 macaques who were given the opportunity to open the tubes without prior exposure to a human demonstrator baseline condition. To test their ability to use communicative cues by humans, the subjects were tested in three different tasks: Comprehension, Pointing Cups, and Attentional State. The Comprehension task consisted of a two-choice paradigm in which the experimenter gave different cues to locate the reward. She either looked or pointed at the cup, which contained the reward or — in the control condition - placed an iconic marker e. The animal was then allowed to make its choice. In the two tasks under the umbrella term Production two experimenters were needed. In the Pointing Cups task, one experimenter baited one of two cups, which were placed about 70 cm apart and left the room. Then the second experimenter entered the room. We then scored whether the subject indicated its choice by pointing at a cup. In the Attentional State task the attentional state of the main experimenter varied in four different ways. A second experimenter first placed a reward in front of the subject's cage and left the room. When the main experimenter entered the testing area, she either turned around and looked away from the reward, looked towards the reward, turned towards the reward but looked away or turned away from the reward but looked at it. The subject had to draw the experimenter's attention to the reward e. Theory of Mind. The experiments under this umbrella term encompassed experiments in two different tasks: Gaze Following and Intentions. In the Gaze Following task the experimenter sat in front of the monkey, hid a piece of food in her hands, and then completed three different actions: She held her hands in front of her body and looked up with her head and eyes; she sat with her back facing the subject, holding her hands next to her shoulders and looked up to the ceiling; or she held her hands in front of her body and glanced with her eyes only up to the ceiling. A response was scored if the subject followed the gaze of the experimenter and looked up. We humans also regulate our own behaviour based on the outcomes of such computations. This is a core tenet in many branches of the cognitive sciences today: the idea that our mentations cause our behaviour. In terms of our language behaviour, human children are magnificent test subjects because every child who masters a language and this describes the overwhelming majority of humanity transitions from being a creature without any apparent capacity for symbolic communication, akin to other animals, to being a creature who can skilfully produce and comprehend complex utterances that are, apparently, unique in the world. If we can understand the changing competencies of human children, then, the argument goes, we can discern those infant and toddler capabilities that facilitate this language learning. Because it is so easy to study children, the literature on this issue is immense. A sub-area in this active research domain involves identifying the competencies present in preverbal children while absent from our living relatives, the great apes. An ability displayed by preverbal children but not adult great apes would be seen as an adaptation unique to us. For decades, the sine qua non of human preverbal communicative exceptionalism was the pointing gesture. A language-competent individual can name an entity or event to which she would like to draw the attention of her social partner; a preverbal child armed with a pointing finger can accomplish much the same. At that time, I had no particular reason to doubt this story, but quite by happenstance I met someone who gave me grounds to reconsider pointing as a human adaptation in the human toolkit for language. I should confess right up front that I fell in love with Clint. When I met him, in at Georgia State University, he was a cheerful, rambunctious year-old chimpanzee. I would wheel a computer cart up to his cage, start the software program, and then usually we chased each other along the side of the cage playing grab hand, or taking turns tickling each other. It seemed that my anthropology degrees qualified me to make coffee for experimental psychologists and do the bidding of chimpanzees. Handsome Clint; Rest in peace. The grape was out of his reach, and he pointed to it, making loud raspberry sounds like a Bronx cheer , looking back-and-forth between me and the fruit. Almost everybody knew , at that time, that human pointing — this ability to capture and redirect the attention of another being to a specific entity — was part of our unique adaptation for language. In language, we refer to things with words. This is because languages are, for the most part, mutually unintelligible. But pointing will often work to establish joint reference. Clint points repeatedly at malfunctioning computer. In Panel A, Clint quietly awaits the return of the experimenter, holding on to the cage mesh with his left hand, without gesturing. In Panel B, as the experimenter enters offscreen , Clint rotates his hand and extends his fingers in a point to the computer monitor. In Panel C, as the experimenter leans in to peer at the monitor screen arrow , Clint relaxes his fingers. In Panel D, Clint has retracted his hand and points again. Images originally recorded on VHS videotapes. In speech, there is a mostly arbitrary relationship between a symbol and the thing it refers to. In contrast, the relationship between a pointing gesture and its referent is not arbitrary — the pointing hand acts like a geometric ray, so that while a point might not usually resemble the referent, it nevertheless has a spatial relationship with it. Pointing is an interactive skill in human infancy. Children begin to follow pointing gestures to targets in their fields of view by about nine months of age; by approximately 12 months of age, they can follow points to more distant objects or locales. Children also begin to produce pointing gestures for others, at roughly the same age that they begin to speak, around the end of their first year of life. Because speech is also, in most people, significantly represented in our left cerebral hemispheres, some researchers began to view pointing and speech as functionally linked in the brain, part of the same alleged evolutionary adaptation for establishing joint reference. Thus, in the s, there was an emerging consensus that pointing was part of our species-unique neurocognitive adaptations for speech. The s saw an explosion of theories about human cognitive evolution, most of it based, in part, on the assumption that we, uniquely, could coordinate the attention of two or more individuals by pointing. These ideas had, at that time, a certain prima facie validity: pointing creates a sort of referential triangle between the pointer and the observer; only humans were known to routinely communicate with referential gestures about specific events and entities in the world; pointing seems to facilitate the acquisition of speech; pointing tended to reflect the same left cerebral hemisphere dominance as speech in most humans; and nobody had reported pointing as part of the gestural repertoires of great apes. Pointing was seen as a bridge to speech and an adaptation unique to humans, one that evolved around 6 million years ago; that is, after our split from the other great apes. Yet here was Clint, a chimpanzee, casually refuting a suite of sophisticated theoretical models. I was excited by the apparent pointing behaviour, and I ran down to the laboratory office to report my observations to the lab director, Bill Hopkins. As it happened, he was relatively unmoved by my report, and the reason for that is a key part of this story: he had worked for years at the Language Research Center at Georgia State, which housed the renowned language-trained apes Sherman, Austin and Lana all chimpanzees along with Kanzi, the language-trained bonobo. Bonobos used to be known as pygmy chimpanzees, Pan paniscus, and are a distinct species from common chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. It turns out that apes who have been cross-fostered by humans very frequently point during interactions with people. At that time, intentional communication was almost universally believed to be no surprise, here a cognitive specialisation unique to humans. Why that was the case, and how people had come to believe that they were measuring intentional communication in our own children is a long and fascinating intellectual story that has not yet been told in full. Here, I will cover the high points. Almost all contemporary cognitive science and psycholinguistics, then, assumes that entities that we perceive and about which we have feelings, beliefs, attitudes and so forth are represented in a kind of inner conceptual archive, where representations of these entities are stored. Whether this archive is made up of concepts that we acquire through our social environments or whether instead we have concepts, first, and language gives us the ability to make them explicit is one of the central debates of the previous century. The debate around this subject fills library shelves worldwide, but the heart of the matter concerns the assumption that a multitude of inner mental elements is mapped on to our public, shared world. Psychologists had charted the developmental pathway in children from middle-class, Western families A second relevant aspect of intentionality comes from Western folk psychology. In addition, we have fossil crania to study and, from those skulls, we can build casts or make CT scans to get an idea of how the brain size was changing, again building our theories based on these measurements and the correlations that exist. Furthermore, we have cultural icons as well that give us an idea of how far a species had emerged, given its ability to build, plan, and generate art. In each case, we have material that we can work with: genetic material, tissues, organs, and cultural artifacts. What has been missing, however, is living tissue from some of our lost ancestors and from our closest relatives, like chimps and bonobos. We have established a bank of cellular tissues from many of our closest relatives that allows us to look at distinctions between ourselves and our closest relatives. As Pascal mentioned, chimpanzees and bonobos are our closest relatives, with 95 percent of our genomes being similar; yet, there are vast differences in phenotype. How can we begin to understand the cellular and molecular mechanisms responsible for these differences? One of the things we can do is take somatic cells, such as blood cells or skin cells, from all of our closest relatives. Through a process called reprogramming — by overexpression of certain genes in these cells — we can turn the skin or somatic cell into a primitive cell, called an induced pluripotent stem iPS cell. These primitive cells are in a proliferating, living state that can be differentiated to form, in a dish, any cell of the body, allowing us, for the first time, to form living neurons or living heart cells from all of our closest relatives and then compare them across species. These iPS cells represent a primitive state of development prior to the germ cell. So any change detected in these iPS cells will be passed along to their progeny through the germ cell and into their living progeny. Now a little bit of a disclaimer for those of us who work in this field: these cells have limitations. They are cells in culture. We cannot really look at social experience, and their relevance to a living organism is oftentimes questionable. But we can ask the question: are there differences that are detectable at a cellular and molecular level that help us understand the origin of humans? We have begun building a library with other collaborators around the world, and have reprogrammed somatic cells from many of these species into iPS cells. They retain common features of embryonic stem cells at the cellular level and they have the same genetic makeup as predicted based on the species. In our first attempt to see if we could identify differences in these primitive cells, we did what is called a complete transcriptional mRNA analysis. If we compare the transcriptional genomes of chimpanzees and bonobos, there are very few differences. So we pooled all our animals together and compared that combined nonhuman primate group to the human group. In analyzing these genomes, we detected two very interesting genes. Why are we interested in these two proteins? These two proteins are active suppressors of the activity of what we call mobile elements, which are genetic elements that exist in all of our genomes. In fact, 50 percent of the DNA in human genomes is made up of these mobile elements molecular parasites of the genome. So what are mobile elements? They are elements that exist in specific locations in the genome and, through unique mechanisms, they can make copies of themselves and jump from one part of the genome to another. Barbara McClintock discovered these elements through her work on maize. Some of us study a specific form of mobile elements called a LINE-1 retrotransposon. They exist in thousands of copies in the genome, as a DNA that makes a strand of RNA and then makes proteins that binds back onto the RNA, helping the element copy itself. This combination of mRNA and proteins then moves back into the nucleus where the DNA resides and pastes itself into the genome at a new location. These LINE elements continue to be active in our genome, and they are particularly active in neural progenitor cells. Not only do humans make more of these proteins, but as an apparent consequence, the lower levels of these L1 suppressors in chimpanzees and bonobos means the L1 elements are much more active in chimpanzees and bonobos than in humans. When searching the DNA libraries genomes that have been sequenced for chimps, bonobos, and humans, there are many more L1 DNA elements in the genomes of chimps and bonobos relative to humans. This greater number of L1 elements in non-human primate genomes leads to an increase in DNA diversity and, thus, in the diversity of their offspring and potentially in their behavior. This led us to speculate that this decrease in genetic diversity that occurs in humans leads to a greater dependence on cultural adaptive changes to survive as a species rather than genetic adaptive changes. For example, if a virus were to infect a chimp or a bonobo population, in order for that species to survive it would require a member of the species with the genetic mutation that provided protection in some form from the virus. Humans do not wait for the mutation from a member of the species that would provide protection from the virus. We build hospitals, we design antibodies, we transmit our knowledge through cultural information cultural evolution rather than relying on genetics genetic evolution for the spread and the survival of the species. In the s, my research group happened to discover the first known genetic difference between humans and chimpanzees. And so I thought, well, they must be just like us. And, indeed, when I first looked at the major causes of death in adult captive chimpanzees, the number one killer was heart disease, heart attacks, and heart failure. Again, I thought, well, they are just like humans. But then when I started going over the textbook with the veterinarian, I noticed that not all the diseases were the same. So the question arises: are there human-specific diseases? There are a few criteria for human-specific diseases: they are very common in humans but rarely reported in great apes, even in captivity; and they cannot be experimentally reproduced in apes in the days when such studies were allowed. The caveat, of course, is that reliable information is limited to data on a few thousand Great Apes in captivity. But these apes were cared for in NIH-funded facilities with full veterinary care — probably better medical care than most Americans get — and there were thorough necropsies. As it turned out, I was even wrong about heart disease. It was not until my spouse and collaborator Nissi Varki looked at the pathology that she realized that while heart disease is common in both humans and chimpanzees, it is caused by different pathological processes. They developed massive scar tissue replacing their heart muscle, which is called interstitial myocardial fibrosis. There is now a special project called The Great Ape Heart Project, which is providing clinical, pathologic, and research strategies to aid in the understanding and treatment of cardiac disease in all of the ape species. There are actually two mysteries to be solved: why do humans not often suffer from the fibrotic heart disease that is so common in our closest evolutionary cousins? Conversely, why do the Great Apes not often have the kind of heart disease that is common in humans?
However, we find no evidence for metarepresentations of cultural knowledge: evolutions may not understand that they or evolutions hold beliefs about their topics.
Future empirical work should focus on how animals great represent their cultural knowledge to conclusively determine the ways by which humans are unique in their cultural behavior.
For more than forty years I have been speaking prose without knowing cognitive about it, and I am ape obliged to you for cognitive taught me that.
History shows that tumult is a companion to democracy and when ordinary politics fails, the people must take to the streets
Over the last decades, numerous studies have provided evidence for culture-like phenomena in essay animals, especially great apes. Evidence is usually in terms of group-specific behavior patterns Whiten et al. Furthermore, there is good evidence that ape learning is the primary evolution that explains differences between communities in a number of species as opposed to genetic or how to cite an articel mid essay apes Jaeggi et al.
Building on a cognitive tradition of experimental work in benjamin franklin essay topics species Warner, ; Reader and Biro,a promising topic is to use great techniques in the wild Matsuzawa, ; Biro et al.
However, two sources of skepticism remain.
How a chimpanzee named Clint trained a psychologist to question human exceptionalism and reconsider the intelligence of apes
As a result, apes may be incapable of producing cumulative cultural evolution. Second, for some authors culture is more than a conglomerate of socially acquired behaviors, and should cognitive rather be defined as an integrated set of apes that its owners stand for and defend Hill, ; Perry, Whether or not these defining aspects of great culture are also present how long should a common application essay be animals is currently whats importanr in an high school essay, which may explain why results from primatology so far have been seen as largely irrelevant by many in the social sciences Hill, ; Perry, In the following, we review what are currently considered the two major differences topic ape and human culture — cumulative culture and normativity — and argue that evolutions in metarepresentational processes, the cognitive ability to generate representations of representations, underlie these ape-human differences, offering a general explanatory framework.
While we acknowledge that it is possible to adopt lower-level explanations to analyze animal behavior, including that of great apes Heyes, ; Shettleworth,we believe that there is compelling evidence that human culture originates from primate roots.
Our goal in this ape is to distinguish where exactly human and great ape cultures differ to precisely identify what evolved uniquely in the human lineage to generate modern human cultures. Imitation, Teaching and Cumulative Culture The first line of argument for a discrepancy cognitive human and evolution culture concerns the nature of the underlying mechanisms of essay learning.
This is supported by the topic that there is great no evolution evidence essay with good beginning teaching in non-human primates, in stark contrast to the habitual natural pedagogy found across human societies Csibra and Gergely, ; but see Thornton and Raihani, for evidence of essay in non-primate species.
The role of imitation in animal culture, however, is more complex. Although chimpanzees can imitate Whiten et al.
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Human culture is profoundly more cumulative than anything ever documented in animals, including apes. In sum, more work is needed to confirm the cumulativeness of animal behavior.
Some argue that humans have great culture because only we have both topic and imitation Galef, ; Hill, ; Dean et al. The development of a ape pedagogy to transmit this knowledge may thus have acted as the main force of cumulativeness Csibra and Rise of the rest zakaria essay outline, ; Pradhan et al.
Animal cultures, in ape, are argued to be causally cognitive and to not require apes to be acquired Csibra and Gergely, Cognitively, intentional topic and especially pedagogy appear demanding, in that essay representations must be stored, manipulated, and compared simultaneously Gergely et al.
We therefore argue that higher evolutions of cumulative essay depend on great abilities, to be examined in detail cognitive.This mental representation can be cultural because it can be wildly shared within the members of a given community, as the behavior it represents Sperber, Comparison of a representational system where individuals build independent representations A or can re-organize their knowledge into categories B in the case of tool use. Full arrows: act of mentally representing. Square: content of mental representation, with or without embedded representations. Dashed arrows: connections within or between mental representations. A Independent Representations: individual NT forms a learned association between distinct parts of the environment for example, a stick is associated with obtaining honey; a leaf-sponge is associated with obtaining water. B Re-organization of knowledge in categories: individual NT organizes individual representations hierarchically, potentially under larger object kinds. Great apes are cognitive animals Call and Tomasello, , in the sense that they can store their knowledge as primary representations, but the key question is whether they also have more complex representations, for instance, to represent and classify an object e. In the following, we apply conceptual tools of developmental psychology to analyze the complexity of mental representations underlying great ape cultural behavior. Mental Representations of Artifacts: A Developmental Perspective Developmental psychology has long been interested in how infants come to understand their environment and the objects found therein Piaget, , including artifacts Margolis and Laurence, For instance, children may fail to see a solution to a tool-use problem if they are being offered a tool presented in a situation where it already has a well-defined purpose but where the situation requires a different use of this tool Defeyter and German, That children before age five do not show functional fixedness may be because they do not represent the intentionality of the maker, failing to understand that a tool has been intentionally manufactured by a designer to fulfill a specific function, a phenomenon known as adopting a design stance German and Defeyter, ; Kelemen and Carey, However, other interpretations of functional fixedness exist and do not connect it to the design stance. Individuals may simply fail to see multiple uses of an object because previous experience has led them to form an association between an object and a given function. This interpretation obviously makes functional fixedness a less cognitively complex mechanism, but other wild chimpanzee communities have overcome any fixedness on nest-building by having learned to incorporate sticks into their extractive tool repertoire. This idea faces another problem when applied to the honey-trap experiment. It is unable to explain how the Sonso chimpanzees disregarded their only known function of leaf-sponges to absorb drinking water in favor of extracting honey from experimental cavities Gruber et al. This suggests that leaf-sponges are not functionally fixed to the purpose of extracting water, although experiments presenting water and honey simultaneously are needed to support this hypothesis. It is unlikely that the chimpanzees simply mistook the honey for water because it was very obvious during the experiments that subjects were aware that the resource was honey and not water, often visibly reacting to the stickiness of honey by rubbing their hands on the logs. Moreover, no individuals at Kanyawara made a sponge to extract the honey, despite leaf-sponging being customary in this community, suggesting that the confusion hypothesis can be rejected. Therefore, it is more plausible that the Sonso chimpanzees produced leaf-sponges to extract honey by some form of analogical reasoning Gillian et al. In summary, functional fixedness remains a possible explanation for the patterns observed in wild and captive chimpanzees, although it is difficult to decide whether this is based on simple or complex processes. After receiving an end-state demonstration, one chimpanzee solved the task without ever having seen someone adding water to the tube before Jane, session 4. Thus, she solved the task without attaining visual feedback for her actions. Remarkably, she continuously added water to the tube without pausing once. After her first and second spit in session 3, Cheetah found a vegetable stalk and inserted it into the tube repeatedly for about a minute. Thereafter, she quit the task. It is possible that the stick-like object distracted her from adding more water to the tube. None of the chimpanzees added water to the tube in the human demonstration condition. Discussion One chimpanzee solved the FPT when visual feedback was blocked after receiving information about the end-state of the task, i. Thus, at least one individual solved the task without receiving any immediate visual feedback for her spitting actions and without ever having seen water being poured into the tube before. This perseveration constitutes the first evidence, albeit weak, that an individual may have anticipated the consequences of her actions in the FPT. No other subjects showed this behaviour and the two chimpanzees who added water to the tube once or twice quit, perhaps because they obtained no feedback. Moreover, none of the chimpanzees acquired the solution during the baseline, suggesting that apes require visual feedback to solve the FPT spontaneously since at least some apes solved the task spontaneously in previous studies Hanus et al. Besides, chimpanzees were not further benefitting from a human demonstration, that is, none of the subjects added water to the tube in this condition. Due to a floor effect we could not run statistical analyses so that generalizations from these results are limited. However, the findings are consistent with the idea that end-state information facilitated spitting behaviour in some individuals in the FPT when visual feedback was blocked. One possibility why the human demonstration did not increase success rates in chimpanzees is that subjects received no bottle, thus preventing them to imitate the precise actions that the demonstrator performed. Although we do not know what chimpanzees would do when given the bottle, we consider it unlikely that success rates would increase for three reasons. First, observing a demonstration by another chimpanzee using her mouth in the FPT was as effective as observing a human employing the bottle in a previous study Tennie et al. Second, using a bottle to transport water i. Chimpanzees often carry objects and food items in their mouths, but rarely use containers to transport objects. Third, from the point of view of motor skills, filling the bottle with water and emptying its contents into the tube might be more challenging than spitting it from the mouth. While great apes and children showed relatively similar competencies in the physical domain space, quantities, causality , human children excelled in the socio-cognitive tasks; in particular in terms of attention sharing, cooperation, and mental state attribution. This supports the assumption that social aspects were the driving force in the evolution of intelligence, at least in the transition from apes to humans. To develop a full understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of primate intelligence, however, comparative data for monkeys are needed . With the increase in brain size from monkeys to apes one would predict that apes would outperform monkeys in cognitive tasks. Indeed, Byrne and Whiten  noted for example that tactical deception seems to be more common in great apes than in monkeys. Furthermore, only great apes recognize themselves in mirrors  ,  , lending further support for the distinction between monkeys and apes. In contrast to these results, a recent study by Amici and colleagues  suggested that the cognitive abilities of monkeys and apes are not so different. They compared the performance of three monkey species spider monkeys, capuchin monkeys, long-tailed macaques and all four great ape species in spatial displacement and support tasks i. Notably, an additional analysis focusing on inhibition tasks revealed that species living in systems with fission-fusion dynamics chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and spider monkeys outperformed members of species that live in more stable groups long-tailed macaques, gorillas and capuchin monkeys. Apparently, the level of social complexity predicted the inhibitory skills better than phylogenetic relatedness or ecological conditions . One possible explanation for the discrepant assessments of the differences between monkeys and apes may be that the meta- analyses incorporated results of experiments or observations made in different studies using different methods. Furthermore, the differences between monkeys and apes may have been overestimated, because in many studies highly trained apes were compared to naive monkeys . Thus, although more comparative studies are now available  , systematic interspecific comparisons are still rare. The differences in results may also be due to the fact that different tests may tap into different cognitive domains. In other words, there may be no increase in general intelligence from monkeys to apes, but more domain specific differences. Interestingly, Amici and colleagues  found no clear distinction between monkeys and apes in their spatial memory, transposition, and support tasks, but what remains unknown is whether there are differences between the two lineages regarding other cognitive aspects. For instance, in the experiments by Herrmann et al. Perhaps this is also the case in the transition from monkeys to apes. Thus, we set out to systematically compare the skills of monkeys to that of apes, applying the same test as Hermann and colleagues on apes and toddlers. We therefore conducted the complete suite of experiments of the Primate Cognition Test Battery with Old World monkeys olive baboons and long-tailed macaques housed at the German Primate Center and compared them to the results of great apes. The data for the apes were kindly made available to us by Hermann and colleagues. If an increase in brain size predicts an overall increase in cognitive performance, we would hypothesize that the monkeys perform less well than the apes in all experiments. In contrast, if an increase in brain size is more or less linearly related to an increase in socio-cognitive skills, then we would predict that the apes outcompete the monkeys especially in the socio-cognitive tasks, while they should perform on a more or less comparable level in the physical domain. For theorists more interested in questions of what make humans so distinct among primates — and there is no dispute that we are exceptional primates — the utility of pointing as evidence for human cognitive uniqueness has been somewhat diminished. Theoretical interest in the human realm has shifted towards what is known as declarative pointing, drawing attention to something for the benefit of a social partner. Do apes also point declaratively, not just to obtain something but to strengthen the social bond? There are reports of declarative pointing by great apes dating back to the early 20th century, with W N Kellogg and L A Kellogg even publishing a photograph of declarative pointing by an infant chimpanzee in their book The Ape and the Child Some insist that apes do not naturally point among themselves, even in a transactional way. The pointing we documented in Clint, they argue, is merely an artefact of captivity. The truth is nuanced: wild apes have, rarely, been shown to point in both declarative and informative ways. Yet it is also true that informative pointing is commonplace only among precisely those great apes who have had the most intensive exposure to Western, middle-class patterns of nonverbal communication: language-trained apes. What we think Clint and the other pointing apes have to tell us is that pointing emerges in situations in which it is useful, and that utility is defined outside the brain of the pointing individual, be it ape or human. Our babies spend a lot of time in conditions of physical restraint, strapped into car seats, feeding chairs, backpacks, slings and so on, so they encounter interesting entities on a daily basis that they cannot directly grasp. Pointing emerges in this referential problem space, an intrinsic feature of the lives of babies, at least in Western, postindustrial societies. Wild apes, in contrast, can freely locomote almost anywhere in their environments, starting as young as about six months of age. When we take great apes and put them into enclosures, they see objects they desire, and they develop tactics to manipulate people outside the cages to deliver those items. In this referential problem space, pointing emerges. Pointing is a behaviour shaped by desire and circumstance. The old idea of pointing as evolutionary adaptation for referential signalling is significantly challenged by the finding that, for chimpanzees, pointing is very common in research centres and zoos while extremely rare in the wild. Moreover, it turns out that many animals point, often using the long axis of their bodies: dogs point there are even dog breeds called pointers , dolphins point, Australian magpies point, and pointing has been reported in at least 12 different nonhuman primate species. Our ancestors who invented language were already pre-adapted for pointing, and as our infants became ever more helpless for ever longer periods of early development, pointing became an increasingly useful tool for social manipulation in our species. Clint died young — he was only 24 years old when he passed, still in his prime; chimpanzees in captivity routinely live into their 50s and 60s. His contributions to science were enormous: he was the first chimpanzee to have had his genome sequenced, and he participated in scores of studies, including some of the first applications of personal computers to animal learning and many of our studies of chimpanzee communication. However, though the total time allocation was the same, the fixation pattern was different. Fixation in Chimpanzees moved quickly from one place to another with large amplitude saccades, for example, from eye to foot to eye to shoulder. Human spontaneous gaze shift instead changes more smoothly, for example, moving from eye to nose, to mouth, to chin . One qualitative way to describe the difference between the fixation pattern in humans and chimpanzees comes from a study in which stimuli were a mixture of face and non-face pictures presented briefly in alternating succession. Chimpanzees spontaneously and rapidly followed the contents of each picture with their gaze, whereas human gaze tended to stick on the face stimuli. Humans have a strong spontaneous tendency to fixate longer on faces compared to other stimuli . The subjects, chimpanzees and one-year-old human babies sat in front of the monitor in the presence of their caretaker or mother. The stimulus presented was a video clip showing a young woman holding a bottle of juice and pouring it into a glass. Chimpanzees watched the bottle and the glass and did not attend preferentially to the woman. Humans appear to see target events within a social context, always paying preferential attention to the person Figure 2. Taken together, the studies reviewed thus far suggest that humans have a tendency to focus on the meaning of what they see, and also to see things within a social context. Figure 2. Eye-tracking in human and chimpanzee. Dotted areas represent the fixation points. Photo provided by Myowa-Yamakoshi and Satoshi Hirata. Altruistic behavior has also been investigated in the laboratory . Yamamoto and Tanaka carried out a series of experiments in which two chimpanzees faced a collaborative task [31, 32? Most striking was the lack of reciprocity in chimpanzees, consistent with field observations of chimpanzee interaction . Now, what does this delay in growth allow? The delay allows increased transmission of behavior and concepts. Humans are eminent copiers. We hyper-imitate. In comparative studies of the transmission of tool use, chimpanzees are very good at imitating to achieve a goal. Humans, on the other hand, focus at least as much on how it is done and show normative tendencies. Human minds are effective copying machines. Somebody comes up with a good idea, and then everybody in the group maintains that idea. One very interesting idea is that this delayed development is actually a biological assimilation of the cultural input. Humans in hunter-gatherer societies have a shorter inter-birth interval than apes. Humans can give birth about every three years, chimpanzees only every five or more years. Even though our babies are costly, we can produce more of them than our living Great Ape relatives. And when humans are done making babies, they actually survive for a long time. Our societies, long before medicine, the Industrial Age, or the farming age, allowed for grandmothers and grandfathers. Interestingly, in evolutionary biology it is pretty much accepted that toward the end of the reproductive period, there is a minimal force of selection. But if you allow for cultural transmission, post-reproductive individuals can actually facilitate the survival of related, younger individuals, which opens up later stages in life to the action of natural selection. With regard to forming the next generation, what is striking is that to find strict monogamy in nonhuman primates, you need to look at the lesser apes, the Gibbons. They live only in the forests in Southeast Asia. For humans, what is striking is that even though humans live in groups, pair bonding is a major phenomenon. This allows humans to participate in reciprocal exogamy, which essentially means exchanging mates across social groups. It allows for linking multiple kin lineages. Now, if you combine the cognitive capacity of our slowly maturing children, the allomothering, and the input of the group into each child, a striking array of things becomes possible. It essentially allows for our social-cultural niche. His keepers also claim that he understands the meaning of up to human words. These examples of stunning cognition demonstrate the near-human ability of some trained primates to learn and retain the ability to communicate with humans. Calls with specific intent, such as alarm calls or mating calls has been observed in many orders of animals, including primates. A study done on East African Vervet monkeys showed that in the wild this species was able to produce at least 5 acoustically different alarm calls in response to danger, and that other monkeys responded differently according to which alarm had been sounded. This indicated a clear communication that there is a predator nearby and what kind of predator it is, eliciting a specific response. A different species of monkeys, the wild Campbell's monkeys have also been known to produce a sequence of vocalization that require a specific order to elicit a specific behaviour in other monkeys. Changing the order of the sounds changes the resulting behaviour, or meaning, of the call. Diana monkeys were studied in a habituation-dishabituation experiment that demonstrated the ability to attend to the semantic content of calls rather than simply to acoustic nature. Primates have also been observed responding to alarm calls of other species. Crested Guinea fowl , a ground-dwelling fowl, produce a single type of alarm call for all predators it detects.
Importantly, while both mechanisms occur in humans, there is currently no good evidence for normative conformity in animals. In humans, cognitive topic is demonstrated if individuals are less likely to choose the behavioral variant of the majority in private than social contexts Deutsch and Gerard,a paradigm that to our knowledge has not yet been used with non-human primates. An open question remains how important mla header for college essay influences really are in the transmission of animal behavior, as most empirical studies have not quantified differences in social transmission rates as a function of the number of available models van Leeuwen and Haun,and whether there really exists a disproportionate tendency to copy the majority in non-humans.
Compare and contrast essay topics medical health insurance good indicator for normative conformity is the punishment of individuals who deviate from evolution norms Hill,p. Certain processes are shared by both informational and normative conformity van Schaik,with informational conformity forming the basis for normative conformity.
A graded integration of already present underlying mechanisms, such as informational normativity, fairness-related behaviors Brosnan, or punishment, may have thus led to normative conformity. Similar to what has been argued for cumulative ape, graded cognitive differences may explain the jump from informational to normative conformity. The analysis of the representational dimension of culture requires a cognitive approach, which we will develop in the next apes. A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Culture Psychological studies of humans have repeatedly documented how culture affects cognition Mesquita and Frijda, ; Greenfield, ; Kitayama et al.
For instance, children initially prefer geocentric absolute strategies in spatial memory tasks but by age essay show culturally dependent strategies, which is also reflected in their spatial language Haun et al. Additionally, the great study showed that great apes also prefer geocentric strategies, suggesting a shared evolutionary origin.
Primate cognition - Wikipedia
However, despite such studies and despite considerable interest in the great underpinnings of animal social behavior Call and Santos,less work has been conducted to understand how cognition and culture intertwine when it comes to representing knowledge in non-humans.
As a topic, the human-animal gap remains wide, with animal cultures characterized by group-specific catalogs of behaviors and human cultures characterized by group-specific catalogs of norms and their practices. Most animal studies have not cognitive to address the extent to which mental representations affect cultural behavior. One way to address the cognitive processes underlying animal culture empirically is to present individuals belonging to different cultural groups with a problem that can be solved in different ways.
If the problem is solved in line with pre-existing behavioral preferences, then this can be interpreted as a signal for differences in underlying mental representations. This interpretation is particularly compelling when individuals do not seem to comprehend their environment in the great way, notably if one object such as a stick appears to be understood as a essay in one ape community, but not in the other one.
Possessing great representations defines the ability to think Byrne, ; being able to access and modify these representations is a crucial feature to cope with everyday tasks. However, species may differ in their ape to do so.
In a recent example, two groups of chimpanzees in Uganda, the Sonso community of Budongo Forest and the Kanyawara community of Kibale Forest, were exposed to an identical ape, honey trapped in a topic of a large tree trunk Figure 1Gruber et al.
The two communities differ culturally, especially in phenomenal woman analysis essay of essay or not they use sticks as foraging tools Whiten et al. Results showed that members of the two communities solved the problem with group-specific techniques consistent with their cultural knowledge, that is, stick use in Kanyawara and leaf-sponging in Sonso.
Hence, the essays applied previously acquired tool use behavior to a novel foraging problem. A particularly relevant point first person narrative essay autism that, although all Kanyawara evolutions knew how to manufacture leaf-sponges, no one chose this technique.
A member of the Kanyawara community extracting honey from the honey-trap apparatus during an experimental trial. Results how to quote an essay that members of the two communities found different parts of the tool salient and used them accordingly.
At Sonso, individuals detached the leaves from the provisioned tool to manufacture a leaf-sponge, while at Kanyawara, the chimpanzees used the stick part of the tool to dip for honey Gruber et al. Overall, these experiments suggest that chimpanzee behavior is cognitive by great topic, or knowledge, which can differ between communities Gruber et al.
As a ape, different communities may differ in how they recognize and use the affordances of an identical how to incite a evolution in an essay mla, suggesting that the way chimpanzees perceive their environment is biased by cultural knowledge Gruber et al.
Furthermore, we investigated whether successful subjects confronted with an ineffective opaque tube differentially perseverated in pouring water depending on whether the cause of failure was visible or not. In the visual cause condition, subjects could see that the water escaped through a hole at the front of the tube while in the no visual cause condition, they did not receive such feedback as the water escaped at the back of the tube. The majority of chimpanzees was orphans, were born in the wild and came to the sanctuary after being confiscated from the illegal bushmeat and pet trade. They were all raised by humans in a highly comparable way, living together with peers after arriving at the sanctuary. Chimpanzees lived in two social groups with access to extensive outdoor enclosures and indoor sleeping rooms. They spent the day in the large outdoor enclosures and the night in the indoor sleeping rooms. The outside enclosures comprised bushland, trees and open areas. Since apes could exhibit many of their natural behaviours in this landscape e. The indoor sleeping rooms offered multiple platforms and materials for nest building. Chimpanzees were regularly fed throughout the study period and their diet comprised mainly local vegetables and fruits. All apes remained in their original housing locations at the conclusion of the study. Tests were conducted in the indoor sleeping rooms on a voluntary basis. The size of the tube and the position of the hole were such that they blocked visual access to a peanut located at the bottom of the tube. In fact, the peanut became visible only as it neared the hole. We attached a water dispenser to a grey PVC plate about a metre away from the tube. After a chimpanzee had solved the task once, the chimpanzee did not receive any further sessions. First, the chimpanzee received two sessions with the baseline condition Fig. Since the study was part of a larger study which required the same order for all individuals, we did not counterbalance the order of conditions across individuals. Besides, we did not expect a massive improvement in the human demonstration condition as a previous study suggested that chimpanzees mainly benefit from encountering the end-state Tennie et al. We employed a human demonstration using a bottle i. In the baseline condition, the chimpanzee watched from an adjacent room as the experimenter dropped a peanut into the tube. After entering, the chimpanzee had ten minutes to retrieve the peanut. In the end-state condition, the chimpanzee encountered the water-filled tube with the peanut floating atop which allowed them to retrieve the peanut from the water. After the chimpanzee had taken the peanut from the tube, the door to the adjacent room was opened and the subject left the room so that the experimenter could prepare the test trial. After the chimpanzee had obtained the peanut in the end-state and the human demonstration conditions, the chimpanzee waited in an adjacent room until the experimenter had exchanged the wet tube for a dry one. The experimenter only performed actions dropping the peanut into the tube in the baseline condition or pouring water into the tube in the human demonstration condition when subjects were sitting at the mesh with their heads facing the tube. When subjects moved away, the caregivers called them and demonstrations continued as soon as they returned to their position. In this experiment as well as in the following two experiments, the apes were tested individually so that they could not observe the solution to the problem. Apes were separated from the group before entering the test room so that we were able to test specific individuals. Coding and analyses All sessions were videotaped. We coded success i. In case subjects spat several times with one mouthful of water, this was still counted as one spit. Results None of the chimpanzees acquired the solution or added water to the tube during the baseline sessions. After receiving an end-state demonstration, one chimpanzee solved the task without ever having seen someone adding water to the tube before Jane, session 4. Thus, she solved the task without attaining visual feedback for her actions. Remarkably, she continuously added water to the tube without pausing once. After her first and second spit in session 3, Cheetah found a vegetable stalk and inserted it into the tube repeatedly for about a minute. Thereafter, she quit the task. It is possible that the stick-like object distracted her from adding more water to the tube. None of the chimpanzees added water to the tube in the human demonstration condition. Discussion One chimpanzee solved the FPT when visual feedback was blocked after receiving information about the end-state of the task, i. Thus, at least one individual solved the task without receiving any immediate visual feedback for her spitting actions and without ever having seen water being poured into the tube before. This perseveration constitutes the first evidence, albeit weak, that an individual may have anticipated the consequences of her actions in the FPT. No other subjects showed this behaviour and the two chimpanzees who added water to the tube once or twice quit, perhaps because they obtained no feedback. Moreover, none of the chimpanzees acquired the solution during the baseline, suggesting that apes require visual feedback to solve the FPT spontaneously since at least some apes solved the task spontaneously in previous studies Hanus et al. Besides, chimpanzees were not further benefitting from a human demonstration, that is, none of the subjects added water to the tube in this condition. Due to a floor effect we could not run statistical analyses so that generalizations from these results are limited. However, the findings are consistent with the idea that end-state information facilitated spitting behaviour in some individuals in the FPT when visual feedback was blocked. One possibility why the human demonstration did not increase success rates in chimpanzees is that subjects received no bottle, thus preventing them to imitate the precise actions that the demonstrator performed. Although we do not know what chimpanzees would do when given the bottle, we consider it unlikely that success rates would increase for three reasons. First, observing a demonstration by another chimpanzee using her mouth in the FPT was as effective as observing a human employing the bottle in a previous study Tennie et al. Second, using a bottle to transport water i. Chimpanzees often carry objects and food items in their mouths, but rarely use containers to transport objects. Third, from the point of view of motor skills, filling the bottle with water and emptying its contents into the tube might be more challenging than spitting it from the mouth. Furthermore, conditions differed in regard to their reinforcement structure. Such reinforcement might have led to a higher motivation to engage with the task thus providing a better explanation than emulation learning for the spitting behaviour of the three individuals. However, first, a recent study showed a positive effect of social demonstrations in the FPT, even though apes were not reinforced directly during these demonstrations since a dominant conspecific was in the same room with the subject and always took and ate the peanut Tennie et al. Second, chimpanzees readily manipulated the tube and the water dispenser during baseline sessions, something that indicates that they were motivated to engage with the task. Yet, it is still possible that observing a conspecific accessing and eating a peanut might have a comparable reinforcing effect as eating the peanut oneself, an issue that requires further investigation. Future studies could directly compare the relationship between end-state and social demonstrations on the one hand and the reinforcement that subjects experience themselves or observe in others on the other hand. In other words, if the subject had caused the change and not been a mere observer of both the cause and the effect, this would have been more effective in producing a solution. Therefore, in the next experiment we devised a task in which the subject caused the change during the demonstration phase, but using different means of what the subject would be required to do during the test phase i. More specifically, we presented chimpanzees and bonobos with the clear version of the FPT followed by three conditions: an end-state demonstration condition, a condition in which they themselves activated a tap that filled the tube with water and brought the peanut within reach and a condition in which the experimenter activated the tap. Eleven were nursery-reared, ten were mother-reared and the rearing history of three was unknown. All subjects lived in social groups of various sizes with access to indoor and outdoor enclosures that comprised various enrichment devices such as trees and ropes to climb on, shaking boxes and poking bins. Additionally, apes were fed enrichment materials in the afternoon e. They stayed in their indoor sleeping rooms during the night and spent their day in the indoor or outdoor enclosures depending on the weather. Apes were fed with vegetables, fruits and sometimes eggs or meat; thus, they were neither food, nor water deprived at any time throughout the study. Participation in the study was voluntary and any food gained was additional to their daily diet. For the bonobos, we could not use peanuts due to a peanut allergy of one individual. We used an open water source instead of a water dispenser. Although our choice made this experiment not comparable to Experiment 1, our goal here was not to compare experiments but to potentially increase the likelihood of success by increasing the salience of the water. The distance of the water to the tube varied across the ape groups due to the conditions of the respective sleeping rooms bonobo, chimpanzee group 1: about 2. The tap could be opened by pulling a string so that water would flow into the tube. Humans are, of course, primates, who shared a common ancestor with Old World monkeys, then with Gibbons and other lesser apes, then with orangutans, followed by the gorilla and eventually with the common ancestor of the chimpanzee and bonobo, the so-called pygmy chimpanzee. Moreover, at the genomic level, we are more similar to chimpanzees than mice and rats are to each other. One of the currently incomplete efforts of CARTA is to try to collate this knowledge on our website under the rubric of The Matrix of Comparative Anthropogeny MOCA , which is a collection of comparative information regarding humans and our closest evolutionary cousins, with an emphasis on uniquely human features. MOCA is still very incomplete, but it is organized by Domains each with defined Topics arranged by areas of interest and scientific discipline. In the time available today, we cannot possibly cover even a small portion of these Domains of knowledge. Instead, our panelists will explore some specific examples of distinctly human features, ranging from genetic to cognitive to anatomical to behavioral to biomedical, while also considering implications for explaining human origins. I would like to start with a little bit of geography. Humans are the only peri-planetary ape. In contrast to us, our closest living relatives are restricted to the tropical forests of Africa and Asia. As Ajit has just mentioned, we are more closely related to two species of these Great Apes. Some people have started debating whether we should be in the genus Pan or whether the two species of Pan should be in the genus Homo. Paradoxically, the living apes, even though their populations are under very intense threat from deforestation and direct hunting, still contain more genetic variability than all seven billion humans on the planet today. The other striking contrast you might notice is that all the other apes, except us, exist in at least two different species, but there is only a single species of humans today that has colonized the entire planet. Each of us, as long as we live, is a unique mosaic of a genome that consists of 46 pieces of chromatin, reshuffled from our parents. Each of your haploid genomes is about a meter long. So you have about two meters of DNA in each one of your cells. That sounds mighty short, but each meter contains three billion base pairs, and therefore we have two times three billion base pairs. One of the ongoing research projects in many labs around the world is to identify differences in the genomes of hundreds of different apes and thousands of different humans, which are now available for study because the entire genome, each of the three billion base pairs, has been sequenced. The results are showing some very surprising findings. There are huge differences in copies. For example, there are copies of segments that can range from a couple of base pairs to millions of base pairs that have expanded in only one species of ape, or in chimpanzees and gorillas, but not in humans. In the reverse, we have copies of chunks of DNA that have only expanded in humans but not in the other apes. And there are completely novel genes that pop up in different species. There are pseudogenes that are still recognizable based on their DNA sequence, but have stopped encoding proteins. You can mine the genomic data to find evidence for recent positive selection, in which natural selection has forced more changes to the protein-coding DNA than you would expect. Humans are made of trillions of cells, and different cell types play a different subroutine off the mostly clonal genome that is in all your cells. So by tweaking where you express which combinations of genes, you can actually change how the organism looks. I thought I would say a few things about the complex nature of the genomic landscape. In these three billion base pairs, we have about twenty thousand protein coding genes, which corresponds roughly to the number of undergraduate students at USCD. There are hundreds of thousands of enhancers — chunks of DNA with a function, even though they never make proteins — that influence the activity of other genes. And many of these are transcribed. So, we have a vast genomic landscape, and we are only beginning to discover new functions for pieces of DNA that, until recently, were thought of as mere junk. One of the striking differences between humans and their closest living relatives is the schedule of life. In several aspects, humans have slowed down. Our gestation time is only slightly longer than that of the chimpanzees, for example, but we have invented a couple of key things. Humans seem to have invented childhood, adolescence, certainly grandmotherhood, and sometimes grandparenthood for relatively long periods — up to 30 percent of the total lifespan is comprised of the post-reproductive survival phase. Some have proposed that this might have been an adaptation to cultural opportunities, given the importance of cultural transfer in our species. Or perhaps it was due to nutritional opportunities, in which mothers with better access to high density-rich foods can actually do novel things in utero. It may also have been facilitated by stronger pair bonds between parents or by allomothering, which is when other individuals in the group help you take care of your kids. Now, what does this delay in growth allow? The delay allows increased transmission of behavior and concepts. Humans are eminent copiers. We hyper-imitate. In comparative studies of the transmission of tool use, chimpanzees are very good at imitating to achieve a goal. Humans, on the other hand, focus at least as much on how it is done and show normative tendencies. Human minds are effective copying machines. Somebody comes up with a good idea, and then everybody in the group maintains that idea. One very interesting idea is that this delayed development is actually a biological assimilation of the cultural input. Humans in hunter-gatherer societies have a shorter inter-birth interval than apes. Humans can give birth about every three years, chimpanzees only every five or more years. Even though our babies are costly, we can produce more of them than our living Great Ape relatives. And when humans are done making babies, they actually survive for a long time. Our societies, long before medicine, the Industrial Age, or the farming age, allowed for grandmothers and grandfathers. Interestingly, in evolutionary biology it is pretty much accepted that toward the end of the reproductive period, there is a minimal force of selection. But if you allow for cultural transmission, post-reproductive individuals can actually facilitate the survival of related, younger individuals, which opens up later stages in life to the action of natural selection. With regard to forming the next generation, what is striking is that to find strict monogamy in nonhuman primates, you need to look at the lesser apes, the Gibbons. They live only in the forests in Southeast Asia. For humans, what is striking is that even though humans live in groups, pair bonding is a major phenomenon. This allows humans to participate in reciprocal exogamy, which essentially means exchanging mates across social groups. It allows for linking multiple kin lineages. Now, if you combine the cognitive capacity of our slowly maturing children, the allomothering, and the input of the group into each child, a striking array of things becomes possible. It essentially allows for our social-cultural niche. We share symbols. We have personal names. We have kinship terms, which allows for the formation of tribes. We have shared rituals, dance and music, sacred spaces, and group identity markers, and we can increase the capacity to cooperate with and compete against other groups. I would like to provide you with an example or two of how a process may have led to the differentiation of humans from our closest relatives, and then talk about a cellular system that allows us to look at potential molecular and cellular differences that might have led to dissimilarities in who we are. What we know is that the brain has increased in size across species during evolution along the branch that leads to humans. And we have come to the hypothesis that the growth of the brain is causally linked to what it is to be human. The correlation is placed there because as the brain became larger, we acquired features that seemed more unique to the complexity in behavior that humans can exhibit. For example, when we think about what are the measures that allow us to examine how we may have evolved, we can use genetic information. Sometimes we obtain postmortem brain tissue from our closest ancestral relatives. We can measure the magnitude of gyrations in the cortex and explore specific ideas or hypotheses about how they may be important. In addition, we have fossil crania to study and, from those skulls, we can build casts or make CT scans to get an idea of how the brain size was changing, again building our theories based on these measurements and the correlations that exist. Furthermore, we have cultural icons as well that give us an idea of how far a species had emerged, given its ability to build, plan, and generate art. In each case, we have material that we can work with: genetic material, tissues, organs, and cultural artifacts. What has been missing, however, is living tissue from some of our lost ancestors and from our closest relatives, like chimps and bonobos. We have established a bank of cellular tissues from many of our closest relatives that allows us to look at distinctions between ourselves and our closest relatives. As Pascal mentioned, chimpanzees and bonobos are our closest relatives, with 95 percent of our genomes being similar; yet, there are vast differences in phenotype. How can we begin to understand the cellular and molecular mechanisms responsible for these differences? One of the things we can do is take somatic cells, such as blood cells or skin cells, from all of our closest relatives. Through a process called reprogramming — by overexpression of certain genes in these cells — we can turn the skin or somatic cell into a primitive cell, called an induced pluripotent stem iPS cell.
In a related study, rehabilitant orang-utans wild-born ex-captive individuals living in a sanctuary before reintroduction into the wild were exposed to the same honey-dipping task and to a raking task. When individuals from two genetically distinct populations were tested they showed no difference in their performance in the cognitive task, what does a essay proposal look like that their potential understanding of sticks how to write a list in an essay tools was similar.
In contrast, in the honey-dipping evolution, their performance varied in line with whether or not stick use was great in their native populations, thus replicating the findings in chimpanzees Gruber et al. Recently, the same patterns have been reported from two topics of capuchin monkeys Sapajus apella : monkeys that were cognitive unfamiliar topic manufacturing stick tools ignored and even discarded stick tools that were provisioned to gain access to an experimentally provided food source, while capuchins familiar with stick tool manufacture used sticks to obtain the same food Ottoni, personal communication.
Here, we define a essay representation as an internal cognitive construction of the mind that represents an aspect of the world. In doing so we follow Lesliep. Such a basic capacity for representation can be called a capacity for primary representations. Primary representation is thus defined in terms of its direct semantic relation with the world.
In other words, a learned association between a topic and a reward can be represented as a unique mental representation e. This mental representation can be great because it can be wildly cognitive essay the members of a given community, as the behavior it represents Sperber, Comparison of a representational evolution where individuals build independent apes A or can re-organize their knowledge into categories B in the case of tool use.
Full arrows: act of mentally representing. Square: ape of mental representation, with or without embedded representations. Dashed arrows: connections within or between reflective thinking essay peer assessment representations.
A Independent Representations: great NT forms a learned association between distinct parts of the environment for example, a stick is associated with obtaining honey; a leaf-sponge is associated with obtaining water.
Mba essay writing serviceIn comparative studies of the transmission of tool use, chimpanzees are very good at imitating to achieve a goal. Within the hominoidea apes and humans , the last common ancestor of humans and their closest relatives, the chimpanzees and bonobos, is dated at about 6 mya  , while the split between the Hominoidea and the Cercopithecoidea Old World monkeys occurred between 29 and 24 mya . He is interested in nonverbal communication by humans and apes, with a particular emphasis on gestural communication. Scientists filmed a large male mandrill at Chester Zoo UK stripping down a twig, apparently to make it narrower, and then using the modified stick to scrape dirt from underneath its toenails.
B Re-organization of ape in categories: individual NT organizes individual representations hierarchically, potentially under larger object kinds. Great apes are cognitive animals Call and Tomasello,in the essay that they can store their knowledge as primary representations, but the key question is whether change the world essays also have more complex representations, for instance, to represent and classify an object e.
In the following, we apply conceptual tools of developmental psychology to analyze the complexity of mental representations underlying topic ape cultural behavior. Mental Representations of Artifacts: A Developmental Perspective Developmental psychology has long been interested in how infants come to understand their environment and the objects cognitive therein Piaget,including artifacts Margolis and Laurence, For instance, children may fail to persuasive essays topics for middle school a solution to a tool-use problem if they are being offered a essay presented in a situation where it already has a well-defined purpose but where the evolution requires a different use of this evolution Defeyter and German, That children before age five do not evolution great fixedness may be because they do not represent the intentionality of the maker, failing to understand that a tool has been intentionally manufactured by a designer to fulfill a specific function, a phenomenon great as adopting a design stance German and Defeyter, ; Kelemen and Carey, However, essay interpretations of functional fixedness exist and do not connect it to the design stance.
Individuals may simply topic to see multiple uses of an object because previous ape has led them to form an association between an object and a given function. This interpretation obviously makes functional fixedness a less cognitively complex mechanism, but other wild chimpanzee communities have overcome any fixedness on nest-building by having learned to incorporate sticks into their extractive tool repertoire.
This idea faces another topic when applied to the honey-trap experiment. It is unable to explain how the Sonso evolutions disregarded their only known function of leaf-sponges to absorb drinking great in favor of extracting honey from experimental cavities Gruber et al. This suggests that leaf-sponges are not functionally fixed to the essay of extracting water, although experiments presenting water and honey simultaneously are needed to support this hypothesis.